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INTRODUCTION

In April of 2007, defendant and appellant, Tim Turrell, believing that he was acting in a
representative capacity on behalf of his father's estate, sold two modular buildings that had been
sitting unused and unattended on his parents' property for almost four years. Mr. Turrell's
father, Herbert Turrell, who died several years before, was a collector of what his wife of sixty
years, Marian, called junk. Their property was littered with old cars, trucks, parts, scrap iron,
several other moveable buildings and mountains of other materials. Due to his mother's
deteriorating health and inability to see, Tim Turrell was tasked with clearing the property so that
the property could be sold to fund nursing home care. The two modular buildings were just a
portion of the junk Mr. Turrell needed to clear from the property to make it saleable. The sale
for a price of$3,500 saved the Turrell family trust from the expense of hauling them off to the
dump.
Months after the sale of the buildings, plaintiff and respondent, James C. Carpenter
("Carpenter"), made claim that the buildings were his, that he had stored them on the Turrell
property based on an oral agreement with Herbert and that Mr. Turrell owed him $27,000, the
value he place on the buildings. When Mr. Turrell responded that his claim was premised on an
oral agreement with his father for which there was no corroborating evidence and thus barred by
Idaho's Dead Man's Statute (IC § 9-202(3)) (Exhibit G), Carpenter filed a complaint in which he
attempted an end-round that statutory bar by alleging that he had stored the buildings with the
permission of Marian Turrell (R 9). At trial, Carpenter conceded the truth - that he had had no
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dealings whatsoever with Marian Turrell concerning storage of the buildings and that his
arrangement had been negotiated exclusively with Marian's deceased husband (Tr 65, L 1).
Following a one-day trial and over objection based on IC § 9-202(3), the trial court found
that Carpenter had entered into an oral, gratuitous bailment contract with Herbert Turrell (R 71 ).
Even though Carpenter had no independent evidence of his arrangement with Herbert, the trial
court held that the Dead Man's Statute did not prevent Carpenter from proving his ownership of
the buildings based solely on his own, uncorroborated testimony. The trial court also found that
the Dead Man's Statute had no application to the claim before it since (1) no formal probate
proceedings had been filed and (2), in any event, Tim Turrell was not being sued in his
representative capacity. The trial court accordingly held that whether or not Tim Turrell knew of
Carpenter's interest in the buildings at the time they were sold he was guilty of conversion.
This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. In General. In I 989, Herbe1i and Marian Turrell moved to a 5-acre parcel on West

Yukon Road in Post Falls, Idaho (Tr 116, L 6). They had four adult sons, whose names in
descending order cif age are Terry, Tim, Tom and Tracy. Only Tim and Tracy lived locally.
Both Terry and Tom lived hundreds of miles away in Seattle and Salt Lake City, respectively (Tr

104, L 5).
Herbert was a collector and trader. Over the course of many years, Herbert acquired
numerous old cars and trucks, scrap metal, salvaged wood and out buildings that he stored on his
property. Carpenter, who had known Herbert for 20 years and lived only a quarter mile away (Tr
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18, L 18, 23) knew that Herbert bought, sold and traded (sometimes without cash being
involved) over the years and had himself done deals with Herbert (Tr 59, L 9-24). At the time of
Herbert's death, approximately 70 vehicles were located on the property (Tr 134, L 15).
Marian was not involved in Herbert's collection activities. Herbert made it plain to her
long before that it was none of her business (Tr 107, L 19). She did, however, believe that
everything in the yard belonged to her husband (Tr 109, L 10). Although Herbert had mentioned
some buildings that he wanted to take to one of his son's property, Marian never saw the
buildings (Tr 113, L 7).
In 1993, Herbert and Marian Turrell had the foresight to complete a modern estate plan.
They executed a living trust, pour over wills, registered their trust with Kootenai County, and
deeded their real and personal property to the trust (Exhibits H through N). Under the terms of
the trust, Herbert and Marian were the initial trustees. On the death of the first spouse, the
survivor would remain as the sole trustee and the personal representative of the deceased
spouse's estate. Upon the death of the survivor or the survivor's incapacity, the responsibilities
for managing the trust and serving as the personal representative would devolve to the sons
starting with the oldest, Terry. Tim TmTell was next in line if Terry was unwilling or unable to
assume the role of successor trustee.
By 2003, the health of both Herbert and Marian was such that Tim Turrell took had taken
over responsibility for the managing the trust's finances. Herbert suffered from Parkinson's and
trembled too much to do paperwork (Tr 116, L 11). Marian was losing her vision and was
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legally blind (Tr 100, L 3, 15; 116, L 11). Tim took over at Terry's request because Terry lived
in Seattle and was too far away for ongoing involvement (Tr 117, L 8, 22).

B.

The Alleged Bailment Contract. Carpenter testified that he bought the buildings

in question in May of 2003 for $20,000, explaining that he had nothing to verify that claim since
he paid in cash (Tr 16, L 24; 51, L 24). He testified that he planned in storing them on his own
property, but that he found that he would have to remove his gates in order to do so (Tr 29, L 1).
Over objection based on IC § 9-202(3), Carpenter was then permitted to testify that Herbert
Turrell, noticing his plight, said "just bring them up to my house and leave them as long as you'd
like" (Tr 29, L 1). Carpenter did so - leaving the buildings on the Turrell property for the next
three and a half years.
Carpenter had no evidence whatsoever to corroborate his supposed arrangement with
Herbert. Even his friend, David Bouder, who had helped to move the buildings on to the Turrell
property and who had been a friend of Herbert for 30 years !mew absolutely nothing about the
arrangement Carpenter claimed (Tr 91, L 23).
Carpenter knew that there was lots of personal property scattered all over the Turrell
acreage (Tr 53, L 6) and kn.ew that Herbert was in ill health, suffering from Parkinson's (Tr 52, L
17; 54, L 12). Yet he did nothing to document his ownership of the buildings. He did not get
anything signed by Herbert, did not put his name on the buildings, did not put a for sale sign on
the buildings with his telephone number and did not even post the buildings with a copy of his
alleged bill of sale (Tr 54, L 17, 23; 55, L 13). Carpenter did not claim anyone other than
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Herbert was aware of their arrangement and conceded that no one looking at the buildings would
have any way of knowing he owned them (Tr 55, L 8).
C.

Subsequent Events. In 2003, Carpenter left his supposedly valuable buildings

with someone he knew was in ill health without any way of proving that he had not sold or
traded the buildings ·to Herbert. His failure to protect himself, however, got worse. In December
of 2003, less than 7 months after he moved the buildings on the Turrell property, Herbert had a
massive stroke that required him to be placed in a nursing home. Carpenter knew about the
stroke (Tr 55, L 18; 56, L 1), yet, he still did nothing to make sure the family or anyone else
looking at the buildings would know they were his (Tr 56, L 9; 57, L 14). He did not mark the
buildings, did not ask Marian to sign anything, and did not even send Marian anything so that
she would not be confused as to who owned the buildings (Tr 57, L 22; 58, L 1).
For the remainder of Herbert's life, Carpenter did nothing to distinguish his buildings
from the mountain of other items Herbert had stored on his property (Tr 58, L 10). Carpenter
conceded again that while Herbert, the only other witness to his claimed bailment contract lay in
a nursing home, no one looking at the buildings would know he had or claimed any interest
therein (Tr 59, L 6). By then, Carpenter had moved from his nearby home and no longer lived
near the Turrells (Tr 62, L 7).
Even after Herbert died on January 9, 2005, Carpenter did nothing to document his
ownership (Tr 62, L 17). Knowing that Tim Turrell was trying to clear his parents' property to
make it saleable Carpenter made no effort in the following 2 years to remove the buildings, to
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insure the Turrell family agreed the buildings were his, or to verify leaving the buildings where
they were was still acceptable (Tr 66, L24; 62, LI 3).

D.

The Sale. In November of 2006, almost 2 years after his father died, Tim Turrell

was still in the process of clearing his parents' property of the junk his father had collected. He
considered the buildings Carpenter later claimed no differently (Tr 136, L 5; 150, L 4). They were
filled with papers, broken furniture, and bits of particle board (Tr 140, L 3).
Mr. Turrell, believing he was acting as the successor trustee (Tr 141, L 22), thought the
buildings would cost more to haul away than they were worth (Tr 161, L 20). He would have
given them away to someone who would remove them from the property (Tr 162, L 11 ).
However, two individuals who were looking at some of the vehicles Tim Turrell was trying to
sell on behalf of the trust offered him $1,750 for each of the buildings (Tr 161, L 17 - 163, L 3).
Mr. Turrell accepted the offers and deposited the money from the sales in the trust's bank
account, not keeping a penny for himself (Tr 141, L 8, 19).

Five months later, Carpenter called Tim Turrell and demanded that he be paid $27,000
(Tr 127, L 5).
E.

Disputed Testimony. Carpenter claimed that a year or so after Herbert's death

and approximately a year before the buildings were sold Tim Turrell telephoned him to give him
the name of a potential buyer for one of the buildings (Tr 45, L8). Though he claimed he told
Tim Turrell what he wanted for the buildings in that conversation, Carpenter admitted he did not
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tell Tim the buildings were his and conceded that Tim never said he understood Carpenter owned
the buildings (Tr 68, L 3, 19).
Tim Turrell denied that conversation ever took place (Tr 150, L 22- 151, L 4). Instead,
he testified that in March of2005 his mother was assaulted on her property (Tr 124, L 3).
Several months later his nephew chased two people off of the property who claimed to be
looking at the buildings and mentioned Carpenter. Tim Turrell, because he was trying to clean
up the property that even Carpenter described as a junkyard (Tr 70, LI 6), located Carpenter's
cell phone number in his father's records. He called and left a message on his voice mail to
please call ifhe had any interest or knowledge about the buildings (Tr 153, L 8). Carpenter
never returned the call (Tr 154, L 24).
Because of his mother's deteriorating health, Tim and his brothers were in a hurry to
clean the property in order to sell ifto fund nursing care (Tr 154, L 1). Had Carpenter called to
claim he owned the buildings, Tim Turrell naturally would have demanded that Carpenter
remove them from the property to avoid the cost of hauling them away (Tr 155, L 11). Since the
buildings were made of vinyl and had asbestos siding, Tim was not sure what to do with the
buildings (Tr 150, L 8), so the buildings sat for almost another year until Tim received
unsolicited offers to buy them.
Despite the· total absence of logic that Tim Turrell would sell property he knew was not
his father's for pennies on the dollar and subject himself (and perhaps his mother) to this type of
claim when he could have resolved his quandary with the buildings by simply demanding
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Carpenter remove them from the property at his own expense, the trial court accepted
Carpenter's version of his conversation with Tim Turrell (R 70).

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Carpenter filed his complaint in August of2007 naming Tim Turrell and his wife as the
only defendants (R 8). The complaint contained a single cause of action that alleged that Tim
Turrell had converted his buildings.
Following trial, and over defense objection based on IC § 9-202(3), the trial court found
that:
l.

Carpenter had a gratuitous bailment relationship with Herbert and Marian

Turrell despite the fact Carpenter admitted that he had had no communications whatsoever with
Marian concerning ownership of the buildings or his free storage thereof (R 71 ).
2.

Marian Turrell and her agent, Tim Turrell, were grossly negligent in

selling the buildings (R 72).
3.

IC § 9-202(3) was "not relevant" because Carpenter was not making a

claim against "Marianne Turrell or the Estate of Herbert Turrell" (R 72).
4.

Tim Turrell assumed dominion and control of the buildings and

permanently deprived Carpenter of possession of the buildings by selling them to third parties (R
72).
5.

Whether Tim Turrell was aware of Carpenter's ownership of the buildings

and whether Carpenter ever demanded possession be returned were not relevant (R 72-73.
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Te trial court then concluded that the buildings were worth$ 18,000 and ordered
judgment for Carpenter.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Is Idaho's Dead Man's Statute applicable when no formal probate proceeding is

pending?
2.

Is Idaho's Dead Man's Statute applicable in claims against personal

representatives of a decedent other than executors and administrators?
3.

Can application ofidaho's Dead Man's Statute be avoided simply by claiming the

personal representative is being sued in his individual capacity?
4.

Can a claimant who could not recover possession of personal property against a

decedent's estate because of the application ofidaho's Dead Man's Statute nevertheless recover
possession of that property from a decedent's heirs after the decedent's estate is settled?
5.

Was the trial court's finding of"gross negligence" permitted by the pleadings or

supported by the evidence?
6.

Was judgment properly entered against Peggy Turrell in the complete absence of

any claim or evidence that she was involved in the conversion alleged?
ARGUMENT

A.

Idaho's Dead Man's Statute. This appeal presents issues concerning the

application ofIC § 9-202(3) which have never been addressed by this Court - whether Idaho's
"Dead Man's Statute" applies to trustees under a living trust and whether that statute applies
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when no formal probate is initiated. The trial court concluded that the protection of§ 9-202(3)
was available only to personal representatives formally appointed by a court.
IC§ 9-202(3) (or rather its predecessor) was adopted in the 1800s to prevent fraudulent
claims against the estate of a deceased person who was no longer around to defend himself. Its
provisions are "positive, plain and mandatory" (Johnson v. Flatness, 70 Idaho 37, 42 (1949)).
Section 9-202(3) 1 "excludes evidence ... in an action against the personal representative of a
deceased person" (Kolouch v. First Security Bank ofidaho, 128 Idaho 186, 194 (App. 1996))
"upon a claim or demand against the estate ... arising from "any communication or agreement not
in writing, occurring before the death of such deceased person" (9-202(3)).
The purpose of the Dead Man's Statute is "to prevent parties from giving self-serving
testimony about conversations or transactions with the deceased" that cannot be contradicted
(Estate of Miller, 134 Wn. App. 885, 890 (2006)). While extrinsic evidence and the testimony of
disinterested witnesses to the conversations or events giving rise to the claim can be presented,
the interested party to the "communication or agreement" is not permitted absence such
testimony to testify as to what the decedent said or promised since to do so would allow
opportunistic claimants to make uncorroborated and fraudulent claims against the estate of
someone who can no longer defend himself.
IC § 9-202(3) thus precludes testimony by a party in interest who does not have
independent verification or proof from testifying in an action against a decedent's "executor or
administrator" as to any claim against the estate based on any agreement or communication with
1

Section 9-202(3) is repeated and affirmed in IRE 601(b).
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the decedent. The language of§ 9-202(3) was enacted long before the term "personal
representative" was used to describe the function of one acting on behalf of a decedent's estate,
the adoption of small estate administration procedures in which no personal representative is
formally appointed (IC§ 15-3-1201 et seq.) or the common use ofliving trusts to avoid probate
all together.
The rationale behind§ 9-202(3) exists regardless of the formal appointment of an
executor or administrator to wind up a decedent's estate and affairs. A claim based on an oral
agreement where the only two witnesses are the plaintiff and the decedent should be treated no
differently in cases where the personal representative is formally appointed, the estate is so small
the law deems it can be distributed without court supervision, or the decedent had the foresight to
put his assets in trust.
Treating personal representatives of living trusts or small estates differently than one
appointed in a formal probate proceeding also makes no sense. A trustee of a living trust, whose
obligation is to wind up a decedent's affairs and distribute the assets of the trust to its
beneficiaries, could find himself being held personally liable to third parties who would not have
been permitted to testify as to some secret deal or arrangement he had with the decedent long
after the trustee has discharged his duties. For example, a trustee who takes office upon the
death of the settlor has a fiduciary obligation to the beneficiaries of the trust to comply with the
terms of the trust agreement. If those terms requires the trust estate to be liquidated and
distributed to the beneficiaries and the trustee does so, he could find himself being personally
sued for conversion years after he is has discharged his responsibilities by someone claiming
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without any corroborating evidence that some asset the trustee sold based on the good faith belief
it was part of the trust estate that he was the true owner. If that were permitted, this Court would
be sending a signal to all successor trustees of living trusts that the office should be declined
since they could be personally sued for the tort of conversion until the statute of limitations
expires. Likewise, heirs who may want to avoid the expense of going to court by employing the
statutorily authorized small estates administration procedures should also be warned not to
bother since they too could be personally liable for years for conversion based on fraudulent
claims of ownership unless the estate is formally probated.
This Court should accordingly hold that the legislative intent to protect a decedent's
estate from uncorroborated claims whether or not the estate is subject to a formal probate and
whether or not the personal trustee is a successor trustee of an estate planning trust.

B.

Tim Turrell Was A Personal Representative. The trial court dismissed Tim

Turrell's claim that he was acting as the personal representative of his father's estate when he
sold the buildings (R 56). Its rational for doing so was that Tim Turrell was (1) not the personal
representative in that Marian and Terry were named before him and (2) Tim had not been
appointed by the court in a formal probate proceeding (R 55-56). Neither finding is supported by
law or evidence.
First, the evidence was undisputed that Marian and Terry were either incapable or
declined to accept the role of personal representative either of Herbert's estate ofas successor
trustee of the family trust. Marian was elderly, in poor health and virtually blind. Terry Turrell
lived hundreds of miles away in Seattle. Tim accordingly took over what would otherwise have
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been Marian's and Terry's roles (Tr 106, L 18; 117, L 22) and no evidence was offered to the
contrary.
Second, no fonnal appointment from a court is necessary to confirm someone as a
successor trustee to a living trust and a personal representative need not be appointed in small
estates (or where the sole beneficiary is the surviving spouse) in order to wind up the affairs of a
decedent's estate. The successor trustee or the heirs who assume responsibility for distributing
the assets of the decedent as provided by law are still personal representatives regardless of
whether a court is involved.
The trial court thus labeled Tim Turrell as an agent for his mother instead of a personal
representative of his father's estate. In doing so, the trial court erroneously assumed that those
roles were mutually exclusive. They are not. Tim Turrell could still be acting on behalf of his
mother in clearing the property to make it saleable and at the same time be a personal
representative of his father's estate in disposing of his assets.
If IC § 9-202(3) protects personal representatives other than those formally appointed by
a court in a probate proceeding, the evidence established without contradiction that Tim Turrell
should receive its protections.
C.

A Claimant Cannot Backdoor The Dead Man's Statute. The trial court also found

that a claimant could avoid application of§ 9-202(3) by simply not making a demand against the
estate or suing the personal representative in that capacity (R 59). Citing cases for the general
proposition that the testimonial bar of§ 9-202(3) does not apply in cases not brought against the
executor or administrator and that do not involve a claim against the estate (R 56), the trial court
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concluded that Carpenter had successfully eluded the statute by suing Tim Turrell as an
individual.
The trial court's conclusion is a triumph of form over substance. By the trial court's
reasoning, a claimant whose testimony would be barred under§ 9-202(3) ifhe brought a claim
against the estate to recover possession of personal property could sue the personal
representative in his individual capacity for the tort of conversion after the personal
representative, in discharge of his statutory duties, either sold or distributed that asset.
One cannot avoid the application of§ 9-202(3) simply by deciding not to name the estate
or allege that the defendant was acting in a representative capacity. Thus, for example, in
Kolouch v. First Security Bank ofidaho, supra, this Court held that the testimonial bar applied
despite the fact no action against the estate was pending. In Kolouch, a personal representative
tried to justify her use of estate funds to pay for the defense of an action in which she had a
personal interest by claiming she had an oral agreement with the decedent to fund that litigation.
The Court held that even though there was technically no action pending against the estate, a
proceeding against the estate would have been required had she (wearing two hats) first
presented and then rejected her own claim.
No distinction exists in this case. Carpenter's conversion theory is premised on a
contract he allegedly had with Herbert Turrell. If Carpenter could not recover possession of the
buildings from the estate because his testimony would be inadmissible under § 9-202(3), he
should not be able to recover possession from an heir to whom the buildings were distributed (if
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that had been the case) or sue the personal representative as an individual on the theory that he is
neither making a claim against the estate or suing the personal representative in that capacity.
D.

The "Immediate Possession" Element Of Conversion Is Missing. Proof that a

claimant is entitled to immediate possession of the property allegedly converted is an essential
element of the tort of conversion (Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 696 (1984)).
Similarly, an agent who disposes of personal property cannot be held liable for conversion unless
the claimant had the right to immediate possession from the agent's principal or master
Restatement of Torts 2nd ,§ 233(1)). Without proof of such a right, a claim against either the
agent or the principal must fail.
Here, and regardless of the capacity in which Tim Turrell was acting and regardless of
whether he was directly protected by § 9-202(3), Carpenter failed to prove that he was entitled to
immediate possession of the buildings when they were sold in late 2006. On the days each were
sold, the buildings were located the Turrell property, as they had been for going on 4 years. No
evidence was produced that Herbert had ever attempted to convey the buildings to the trust. The
buildings thus remained in Herbert's estate unless and until Carpenter could prove otherwise.
In late 2006, almost 2 years after Herbert died, Carpenter would not have had the right to
enter upon the property and remove the buildings or legally demand that the buildings be
returned to him. Herbert was dead and Carpenter's only proof of ownership (i.e. that he had not
sold or traded the buildings to Herbert) was his own, self-serving testimony about a gratuitous
bailment contract. If Carpenter wanted possession of the buildings over the objection of
Herbert's heirs, he would have had to petition for the appointment of a personal representative
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and then commence a legal action to recover possession (IC§ 15-3-104). Ifhe had done so and
his only proof (as it was at trial here) was his own uncorroborated testimony, Carpenter's bid for
return of the buildings (i.e. possession) would have been denied for failure of proof because of
the testimonial proscriptions of§ 9-202(3).
Carpenter thus would not have been legally entitled to possession on the date the
buildings were supposedly converted because he could not establish his ownership thereof or the
terms under which Herbert held possession. If Carpenter could not have recovered possession
·against Herbert's estate, he cannot prove he was entitled to immediate possession from the
principal such that he can recover against the agent, Tim Turrell.
E.

Putting The Foregoing In Perspective. Summarizing or putting the foregoing into

an easily understandable perspective is best done by example:
a.

If Tim Turrell had been approached after his father's death by someone

claiming that he owned the 1942 Buick rusting out in the field and that Herbert had been holding
it for him free of charge pursuant to an oral agreement (for which he had no independent
verification), could Mr. Turrell be held liable for conversion ifhe refused to let the claimant haul
the vehicle away?
b.

If the 1942 Buick was still in the field, could that claimant successfully

sue the estate of Herbert Turrell to establish his ownership and recover possession?
c.

If the Turrell family had decided it was necessary to formally probate the

estate of Herbert Turrell and Tim Turrell had been appointed his father's personal representative
(after his mother and older brother declined), could he be successfully sued for conversion ifhe
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sold the 1942 Buick after rejecting a claim based on an oral contract for which there was no
independent proof?
d.

If the answer to the foregoing question was no, does it make logical sense

that the claimant could successfully avoid § 9-202(3) by making the simple claim that "I am not
suing you as the personal representative or making a claim against the estate, I am suing you as
an individual"?
e.

If the court appointed personal representative of Herbert Turrell's estate

rejected a claim to the 1942 Buick and commissioned an auctioneer to sell the vehicle, could the
auctioneer be held liable for conversion even though the personal representative was immune
under § 9-202(3)?
f.

If the Buick was the only asset in Herbert's estate, would the family have

to formally probate his estate (i.e. ignore the provisions of the trust and the small estate
administration procedures that would avoid that expense) in order to be able to avoid liability to
the claimant for rejecting his claim under the authority of§ 9-202(3)?
g.

If the personal representative of Herbert Turrell's estate made a

distribution of the 1942 Buick in kind to an heir, could the heir be sued for conversion by the
claimant if he or she sold the Buick or refused a demand from the claimant for its delivery?
Based on the rationale of§ 9-202(3), the answer to all of the foregoing should by "No".
F.

A Judgment Against Tim Turrell Cannot Be Premised On Breach Of A Bailment

Contract. The trial court concluded that Herbert and Marian Turrell entered into a gratuitous
bailment contract with Carpenter in May of2003 and then held that both Marian and Tim Turrell
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were "grossly negligent" for selling the buildings (R 71-72). The trial court's Memorandum of
Decision is unclear if those conclusions were an alternative theory upon which it awarded
judgment against Tim Turrell and his wife. If they were, judgment based thereon cannot stand
against Tim Turrell for two reasons.
First, neither negligence nor the breach of a bailment contract were issues in the case.
Carpenter's complaint alleges one cause of action - conversion (R 8). A bailment contract was
not mentioned in the complaint. At no time before, during or after trial did Carpenter seek to
amend his complaint under IRCP 15 (a) or (b) to add those theories. Even in his Post-Trial Brief
(which the parties exchanged simultaneously) did not ask the trial court for relief (R28).
Carpenter mentioned a baihnent contract for the sole purpose of describing how Herbert
Turrell's possession of the buildings occurred. A cause of action that was never pied, never
briefed, and never argued should not be the surprise basis of ajudgment.
Second, Tiin Turrell could not be held liable for breach of the bailment contract since he
was not, as the trial court so found, one of the bailees. Whether or not supported by substantial
evidence, the trial court found that Carpenter's contract with Herbert and Marian. If that contract
was breached by their agent, the only claim for breach is against the bailees, not the agent
(Brenner v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 96 Idaho 311,313 (1974).

G.

Peggy Turrell Is Not Personally Liable to Carpenter. The judgment entered by the

Court states names Tim Turrell's wife, Peggy Turrell as a judgment debtor. Including her in the
judgment, however, was improper.
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Carpenter's complaint contains no charging allegations against her. Instead, Carpenter
alleged only that the actions of Tim Turrell "benefited the marital community" (R 8). At trial,
Carpenter offered no evidence whatsoever that Mrs. Turrell was involved in any way with the
sale of the buildings.
Under IC§ 32-911, the separate property of the wife is not liable for debts incurred by
her husband. Whether or not the community is responsibility for any liability that may
ultimately befall Tim Turrell in this matter, his wife is not personally responsible such that her
community property can be subjected to execution. Allowing her to remain as a judgment debtor
would give Carpenter the ability to enforce the judgment against property§ 32-911 is exempt
from execution in debts like the one at issue in this case.
Respectfully submitted.
Dean& Kolts

Dated: November 14, 2008
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James A. Raeon
Attorney at Law
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